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Recent Decisions
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-GIFTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF MARRIAGE-The
Supreme Court of New York held that a donor could not recover an
engagement ring upon donee's renouncing her intention to marry
him, where the contract to marry was void since the donor was already
married.
Lowe v. Quinn, 301 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Ist Dep't 1969).
A jilted plaintiff brought an action of replevin to recover a sixty-
thousand dollar engagement ring which plaintiff gave to defendant upon
her promise to marry him. When plaintiff gave defendant the ring, he
was married to another, separated, and contemplating divorce. His status
was known to the defendant. Less than thirty days later, the defendant
renounced her intention to marry the plaintiff and refused to return
the ring. When plaintiff tried to recover the ring, the New York
Supreme Court held that he was not entitled to recovery.
Throughout history, the donor's attempts to recover an engagement
ring after his intended wife jilted him have proved successful. In
England, the principle developed that the donor should recover if
the donee breaks the engagement, and by implication, that the donor
should not recover if the donor breaks the engagement.' This appears
to be settled English law today.2
In the United States, the law has developed in a similar manner.3
Louisiana is an exception since recovery is permitted regardless of who
caused the breach. 4 Nevertheless, a crucial factor in determining
whether the engagement ring would be, or would not be, recovered
has always been whether it was the donor or the donee who broke
the engagement. 5
Prior to the statutory abolition of actions for breach of promise to
marry, New York recognized that the engagement ring was distinct
from other premarital gifts because of its symbolic nature and allowed
1. Young v. Burrell, 21 Eng. Rep. 29 (1576); held: Where plaintiff-donor, as a suitor in
marriage, sued for tokens he delivered to the defendant-donee, the Court ordered "the
tablet to be forthwith delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff." Oldenburgh's Case, 1
Freem. 213, 89 Eng. Rep. 151 (1676); held: where a man courted a lady and presented her
with several jewels, and after, the match breaking off, he brought a detinue for the jewels,
and she offered to wage her law, the Court held that she ought to return them because it
was causa matrimonii proelocuti.
2. Jacobs v. Davis, 2 K.B. 532 (1917); Cohen v. Sellar, 1 K.B. 536, 15 B.R.C. 85 (1926).
3. See, 24 Am. JuR., Gifts, § 56-60.
4. Decuers v. Bourdet, 10 La. App. 361, 120 So. 880 (1929).
Wardlaw v. Conrad, 18 La. App. 387, 137 So. 603 (1931).
5. 3 WYOMING L.J., 147, 149 (1949).
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recovery if the donee terminated the engagement. 6 The New York
statute abolishing an action for breach of promise to marry is popularly
known as the Heart-Balm act. Following the passage of this act, New
York refused to grant relief to the donor on the theory that the action
for recovery was predicated upon a breach of promise to marry.7 In
spite of the holdings of the highest court, there were subsequent New
York lower court decisions which allowed the donor to recover when
the donee broke the engagement because "Common decency and
fairness requires the defendant to return the ring or the value thereof."
Three years after the court barred recovery of engagement rings and
other personal property on the ground that recovery was predicated
upon a breach of promise to marry, a most significant disapproval was
voiced by the New York legislature. The legislature in 1947 passed a
bill providing that courts should not be prevented, in a proper case,
from granting restitution of money or property transferred in the con-
templation of an agreement to marry, where such agreement is not
performed.9 The bill passed both chambers without debate but was
vetoed by the Governor. The Governor's disapproval was not accom-
panied by a memorandum.10 What justified the veto is not known, but
it is reasonable to infer that the New York legislature never intended
the Heart-Balm act to be construed so as to prevent actions for the
recovery of engagement rings and other conditional gifts when the
contemplated marriage did not take place. The objectives of the legis-
lature were to eliminate the indefinite, distorted, and magnified actions
for loss of time, humiliation, mortification, and "broken hearts".
Nowhere in the language of the New York Heart-Balm act do there
appear words which would seem to sustain the prevention of a right
of action for the recovery of an engagement ring in the contemplation
of an agreement to marry.
Finally in 1965 the New York legislature enacted section 80-b of the
Civil Rights Law, which in pertinent part reads:
6. Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 262 N.Y.S. 716 (1933).
7. Josephson v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, 292 N.Y. 668, 56 N.E.2d 96 (1944); Andie
v. Kaplan, 32 N.Y.S.2d 429, 43 N.E.2d 82 (1942).
8. Reinhardt v. Schuster, 75 N.Y.S.2d 779 held: a man was entitled to return of engage-
ment ring given to a woman who broke engagement by insisting that the man leave Texas
where he was well-established to attempt to establish himself in New York so as to permit
donee to be near her parents. Justice DiPirro, in delivering the majority opinion of the
court, made no reference to Josephson v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, supra, note 7.
9. S. Int. No. 116, Senator Young; A. Int. No. 120, Assemblyman Wilson; 1947 Leg. Doc.
No. 65 (j).
10. 13 BROOKLYN L. REv. 174 (1947).
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Nothing in this article contained shall be construed to bar a right
for the recovery of a chattel . . . when the sole consideration for
the transfer of the chattel was a contemplated marriage which
has not occurred. .... .
This enactment is clearly contrary to the case law which the New York
courts had developed since the passing of the New York Heart-Balm
act. 12 Judge Asch, in delivering the majority opinion of Goldstein v.
Rosenthal, concluded that section 80-b of the Civil Rights Law "pre-
sumably restores the common law rules which were in effect prior to
the enactment of the anti-Heart-Balm statute.' 3
Notwithstanding this precedent, the Supreme Court of New York
held in the instant case that a donor could not recover an engagement
ring upon donee's renouncing her intention to marry him, where the
contract to marry was void since the donor was already married. Justice
Steuer in delivering the majority opinion of the court remarked: "It
would logically follow that, there being no valid agreement which
could be breached, the gift remains absolute."' 4
It is submitted that this does not logically follow. The Heart-Baln
act is still in effect in New York, and thereby an agreement to marry
in futuro is an invalid agreement. Nevertheless, section 80-b of the
Civil Rights Law makes it unequivocally clear that the right for the
recovery of a chattel does not depend on a valid agreement. This was
the purpose of section 80-b.15 Therefore, what would logically follow
is that under the circumstances of this case the agreement to many is
an invalid agreement; even if the donor was not married at the time
of the engagement, the agreement to marry in futuro would still be
invalid because of the Heart-Balm act; hence, because the recovery of
a chattel does not depend on a valid agreement, the donor should be
entitled to recover the engagement ring.
"However," Justice Steuer in delivering the majority opinion in the
instant case, stipulated in support of the court's holding, "in juris-
diction where the question has arisen, decision denying recovery has
been placed on grounds of public policy and the equitable principle
11. NEW YoRK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, Article 8, § 80-b (McKinney 1948).
12. NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTIcE ACT, Article 2-A, §§ 61a-i (McKinney 1963).
13. Goldstein v. Rosenthal, 56 Misc. 2d 311, 314, 288 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507 (1968)
14. Lowe v. Quinn, 301 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 (1969).
15. 56 Misc. 2d 311, 314, 288 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507 (1968).
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of clean hands." '16 In support of this contention, he cited Malasarte v.
Keye,' Morgan v. Wright,8 and Armitage v. Hogan.19
In Armitage v. Hogan the donor could not recover because the ring
was an incident of the contract, and "because such contracts are in vio-
lation of the marital duty and contrary to public policy." 20 Malasarte V.
Keye furthered this principle because "all bargains which have for
their object or tendency the divorce of married persons are opposed
to public policy." 21
Because of the circumstances in Lowe v. Quinn, the denial of the
plaintiff's recovery on "the equitable principle of clean hands" trig-
gered a vehement dissent. Justice Tilzer, dissenting in the instant case,
stressed that if the plaintiff-donor is not guilty of inequitable conduct
toward the defendant-donee in a particular transaction, the plaintiff-
donor's hands are as clean as the court can require.2 2 In the instant
case, if the plaintiff-donor was guilty of inequitable conduct, it was
towards his wife and not towards the defendant-donee. Justice Tilzer
emphasized that the dirt upon plaintiff's hands must be his bad con-
duct in the transaction complained of.
23
In.Lowe v. Quinn, the donee was aware of the facts that the donor
was married, separated from his wife for several years and awaiting
an imminent divorce; nevertheless, she accepted the engagement ring
and thirty days later she breached the engagement and refused to
return the ring. Pennsylvania has never had a case directly on point,
but the history of the engagement ring in Pennsylvania indicates that
the plaintiff-donor under the same or similar circumstances of the
instant case would recover the ring.
Prior to the Pennsylvania Heart-Balm act,2 4 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania in Ruehling v. Hornung held:
16. 301 N.Y.S2d 361, 363 (1969).
17. Malasarte v. Keye, 13 Alaska 407 (1951).
18. Morgan v. Wright, 219 Georgia 385, 133 S.E2d 341 (1963). In Malasarte v. Keye,
and in Morgan v. Wright, it was the defendant-donee who was married and not the
plaintiff-donor.
19. Armitage v. Hogan, 25 Wash. 2d 672, 171 P.2d 830 (1946).
20. Id. at - , 171 P.2d at 837.
21. 6 WLLISTON, CONTRACTs, 4933, § 1743 (2d ed. 1938).
22. 301 N.Y.S.2d 361, 364 (1969).
23. Id. There is a Pennsylvania holding in support of Justice Tilzer's contention that
"the dirt upon his [plaintiff's] hands must be his bad conduct in the transaction con-
plained of." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Vercesi v. Petri, 334 Pa. 385, 388, 5 A.2d
563, 565 (1939).
One of the limitations of the doctrine that one coming into equity with unclean hands
is that the wrongdoing of the plaintiff must have been in reference to the very matter
in controversy, and not merely remotely or indirectly connected therewith.
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48 §§ 170-177 (1935).
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'Such a ring is given as a-pledge or symbol of the contract, to marry.
We think that it is always given subject to the implied condition
that if the marriage does not- take place either because of the death,
or a disability recognized by the law on thepart of, either party,
or by breach of the contract by the donee, or its dissolution by
mutual consent, the gift shall be returned.25
And in 1955 with the Pennsylvania Heart-Balm act in effect, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Stangler v. Epler held:
A gift to a person to whom .the donor is engaged to be married,
made in contemplation of marriage, although absolute in form,
is conditional; and upon breach of the marriage engagement by
the donee the property may be returned to the donor. 26
Pennsylvania has recognized that statutory abolition of actions for
breach of promise to marry in no way alters or modifies plaintiff-donor's
right to recover an engagement ring. "The title to the, gifts .. re-
ceived, predicated on the assurance of marriage . . . never left ... [the
donor] until the lnarital knot was tied. '27
If a case should arise in Pennsylvania in which the plaintiff-donor
at the time of the engagement is married, it is submitted that Penn-
sylvania's courts would continue to comply with Pennsylvania's judicial
history-recovery for the plaintiff-donor ,if the defendant-donee
breaches the engagement. The marital status of the plaintiff-donor
under the same or similar circumstances of Lowe v. Quinn should be
construed as immaterial and irrelevant. It is immaterial because the
plaintiff's marital status at the time of the engagement was merely
technical since plaintiff was separated from his wife for several years
and was awaiting an imminent divorce. Even if one concludes that
plaintiff's marital status at the time of the engagement is material, it
is still irrelevant because the plaintiff-donor was not guilty of inequit-
able conduct toward the defendant-donee in this particular transaction.
It is further submitted that to allow the donee to keep the ring after
breaking the engagement under the circumstances of the instant case
would be to allow a party to profit by his own wrong. In Furman v.
Krauss it was said: "The doctrine of unclean hands should not be
allowed to perpetrate an injustice or permit a party to profit by his
25. Ruehling v. Hornung, 98 Pa. Super. 535, 540 (1930).
26. Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 415, 115 A.2d 197, 199 (1955).
27. Paulicic v. Vostsberger, 390 Pa. 502,- 507, 136 A.2d 127, 130 (1957).
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own wrong."28 In Lowe v. Quinn, the defendant-donee would make
a profit. The ring was worth $60,000. In the instant case, Justice Tilzer,
dissenting, made the interesting observation in regard to defendant's
wrongful conduct that it was not the plaintiff-donor attempting to take
another man's wife, but it was the defendant-donee seeking to take
another woman's husband. "And while it may be that the plaintiff's
hands are not too clean, the defendant's hands are covered with more
than diamonds." 29
Throughout history, the donor's attempts to recover an engagement
ring after his intended wife jilted him have proved successful. In
Pennsylvania, the trend of the law in allowing the donor to recover
the engagement ring when the donee breaks the engagement is clear.
In the instant case, the equities in favor of the plaintiff-donor are mani-
fest. If a case such as Lowe v. Quinn should come before a court of
Pennsylvania, it is submitted that the court would allow recovery for
the plaintiff-donor.
William C. Costopoulos
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-QUALIFICATIONS OF CONGRESSMEN-The Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that Congress, in judging
the qualifications of its members, is limited to the standing qualifica-
tions prescribed by the Constitution.
Powell v. McCormack, 89 S. Ct. 1944 (1969).
In November, 1966, petitioner Powell was elected from the 18th Con-
gressional District of New York to serve in the House of Representatives
for the 90th Congress. However, pursuant to a House Resolution,
Powell was not permitted to take his seat.' He then filed suit in the
28. Furman v. Krauss, 175 Misc. 1018, 1021, 26 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1941), afJ'd, 262 App.
Div. 1016, 30 N.Y.S.2d 848, (1941).
29. Lowe v. Quinn, 301 N.Y.S.2d 361, 364 (1969).
1. Powell was denied his seat in the following manner. During the 89th Congress, a
special Subcommittee on Contracts of the Committee on House Administration conducted
an investigation into the expenditures of the Committee on Education and Labor, of
which Powell was the Chairman. The special Subcommittee issued a report concluding
that Powell and certain staff employees had deceived the House authorities as to travel
expenses and that there was strong evidence that certain illegal salary payments had been
made to Powell's wife. (H.R. REP. No. 2349, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1966).) No further
action was taken until just prior to the organization of the 90th Congress, when the
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